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This thesis introduced the Interactively Controlled File System (ICFS), a novel approach to file system access control designed to address the inherent limitations of traditional discretionary access control (DAC) mechanisms in Linux environments. By placing access control decisions directly in the hands of users through real-time graphical prompts, ICFS bridges the gap between coarse-grained flexibility of DAC and the rigid complexity of mandatory access control (MAC) frameworks. The system’s design prioritises usability without compromising security, enabling users to grant or deny process-specific permissions dynamically while maintaining backward compatibility with existing software workflows via the FUSE framework.

The implementation of ICFS demonstrates that granular, context-aware access control can be achieved through a user-centric model. By allowing temporary permissions and scalable policy generalisation, the system minimises both user burden and the risk of overprivileged processes -- a critical weakness in traditional DAC models. Experimental evaluations confirmed ICFS’s effectiveness in restricting unauthorised access while maintaining functional compatibility with diverse applications, including text editors, browsers, and synchronisation tools. However, the system’s reliance on process-level identity checks revealed vulnerabilities in environments involving interpreted languages, containerised applications, and desktop portals. For instance, Flatpak sandboxes and the xdg-desktop-portal daemon obscured process origins, undermining the granularity of access control. Similarly, shell scripting workflows faced usability challenges due to frequent permission prompts, highlighting tensions between security enforcement and practical usability.

Performance benchmarks indicated a measurable overhead in filesystem operations, particularly under heavy usage of that involves permission checking. Yet, real-world usage scenarios showed negligible impact on application responsiveness, suggesting that the trade-off between security and performance is acceptable for typical user workflows. Security limitations, such as the potential for GUI automation tools to bypass access controls on X11 systems, underscore the need for deeper integration with sandboxing technologies and stricter isolation protocols in graphical environments.

Future refinements to ICFS should focus on three key areas: enhancing interoperability with containerisation frameworks to preserve process context within sandboxes, developing session-based permission models to streamline shell script execution, and implementing robust mechanisms to audit and modify stored permissions. Additionally, mitigating risks associated with GUI interaction vulnerabilities will require collaboration with desktop environment developers to enforce stricter access controls for automation tools.

In conclusion, ICFS represents a significant step toward simplifying advanced access control mechanisms by aligning security enforcement with user intuition. While its current iteration exposes inherent challenges in balancing dynamic policy enforcement with system complexity, the framework provides a foundational model for future innovations in user-driven cybersecurity solutions. By addressing the outlined limitations, subsequent development could further bridge the divide between academic security paradigms and practical, user-friendly implementation.