

COMENIUS UNIVERSITY IN BRATISLAVA
FACULTY OF MATHEMATICS, PHYSICS AND INFORMATICS

FILESYSTEM WITH INTERACTIVE ACCESS
CONTROL FOR LINUX
BACHELOR THESIS

Draft

2024
FEDIR KOVALOV

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FILESYSTEM WITH INTERACTIVE ACCESS
CONTROL FOR LINUX
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Draft

Study Programme: Computer Science
Field of Study: Computer Science
Department: Department of Computer Science
Supervisor: RNDr. Jaroslav Janáček, PhD.

Bratislava, 2024
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Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave
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ZADANIE ZÁVEREČNEJ PRÁCE

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Názov: Filesystem with Interactive Access Control for Linux
Súborový systém s interaktívnym riadením prístupu pre Linux

Anotácia: Tradičné mechanizmy riadenia prístupu v operačných systémoch povoľujú rovnakú úroveň prístupu všetkým procesom bežiacim v mene toho istého používateľa. Toto typicky umožňuje škodlivým procesom čítať a/alebo modifikovať všetky údaje prístupné používateľovi, ktorý spustil zraniteľnú aplikáciu. Dá sa to riešiť použitím rôznych mechanizmov povinného riadenia prístupu, no tieto sú často náročné na konfiguráciu a zriedkavo sa používajú v bežných scenároch orientovaných na používateľa. Táto práca sa zameriava na návrh a implementáciu vrstvy súborového systému, ktorá rozhodnutie povoliť alebo zakázať prístup k objektu súborového systému konkrétnym procesom deleguje na používateľa.

Cieľ:

- analyzovať problém a navrhnúť riešenie
- implementovať riešenie využitím FUSE
- otestovať riešenie a demonštrovať jeho prínos

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Title: Filesystem with Interactive Access Control for Linux

Annotation: Traditional access control mechanisms in operating systems allow the same level of access to all processes running on behalf of the same user. This typically enables malicious processes to read and/or modify all data accessible to the user running a vulnerable application. It can be dealt using various mandatory access control mechanisms, but these are often complicated to configure and are rarely used in common user oriented scenarios. This thesis focuses on design and implementation of a filesystem layer which delegates the decision to allow or deny access to a filesystem object by a specific process to the user.

Aim:

- analyse the problem and design a solution
- implement the solution using the FUSE framework
- test the solution and demonstrate its benefits

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Abstrakt

Tradičné mechanizmy riadenia prístupu v operačných systémoch povoľujú rovnakú úroveň prístupu všetkým procesom bežiacim v mene toho istého používateľa. Toto typicky umožňuje škodlivým procesom čítať a/alebo modifikovať všetky údaje prístupné používateľovi, ktorý spustil zraniteľnú aplikáciu. Dá sa to riešiť použitím rôznych mechanizmov povinného riadenia prístupu, no tieto sú často náročné na konfiguráciu a zriedkavo sa používajú v bežných scenároch orientovaných na používateľa. Táto práca sa zameriava na návrh a implementáciu vrstvy súborového systému, ktorá rozhodnutie povoliť alebo zakázať prístup k objektu súborového systému konkrétnym procesom deleguje na používateľa.

Kľúčové slová: riadenie prístupu, súborové systémy, FUSE, súhlas používateľa, najmenšie oprávnenie, oprávnenia, udeľovanie oprávnení, riadenie prístupu riadené používateľom.

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Abstract

Traditional access control mechanisms in operating systems allow the same level of access to all processes running on behalf of the same user. This typically enables malicious processes to read and/or modify all data accessible to the user running a vulnerable application. It can be dealt using various mandatory access control mechanisms, but these are often complicated to configure and are rarely used in common user oriented scenarios. This thesis focuses on design and implementation of a filesystem layer which delegates the decision to allow or deny access to a filesystem object by a specific process to the user.

Keywords: access control, filesystems, FUSE, user consent, least-privilege, permissions, permission granting, user-driven access control.

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Introduction

In modern operating systems, access control mechanisms are fundamental to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of system resources. These mechanisms dictate how users and processes interact with system objects such as files, directories, and devices. However, traditional access control models, such as the discretionary access control (DAC) employed by Linux and other Unix-like systems, operate under the assumption that all processes running under the same user account should have the same level of access to system resources. While this simplifies user management and permissions, it can introduce significant security risks.

The problem arises when a process or application running under a user's account becomes compromised. In such cases, the malicious code or exploit can leverage the user's existing permissions to access or modify sensitive data, potentially leading to data breaches or other security incidents. This fundamental limitation of traditional access control mechanisms underscores the need for a more granular and dynamic approach to file system access control.

Over the years, various mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms, such as SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux) and AppArmor have been developed to address these limitations. These systems enforce access control policies at a more granular level, often based on labels or rules defined by system administrators. While these mechanisms are effective in certain scenarios, they are generally complex to configure and require significant expertise to maintain. As a result, they are rarely adopted in common user-oriented environments, where simplicity and ease of use are paramount.

In this thesis we introduce our approach to file system access control that empowers users to make real-time decisions about which processes or applications should have access to specific file system objects. By integrating an interactive decision-making layer into the file system, this solution aims to bridge the gap between the security benefits of MAC mechanisms and the simplicity required for widespread adoption. The proposed system delegates access control decisions to the user, enabling them to grant or deny access to individual processes or applications on a per-object basis. This approach not only enhances security but also maintains the flexibility and usability that are critical for user-oriented systems.

The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 and chapter 2 provides a

review of existing access control mechanisms and their limitations. Chapter 3 outlines the design objectives, architecture, and the interactive component of the proposed file system layer. Chapter 4 describes the implementation process, including the tools and techniques used to develop the system. Finally, in chapter 5 we present experimental results, evaluate the performance, security benefits and limitations of the proposed solution, and discuss the potential for further development.

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Chapter 1

Filesystem access control on Linux

1.1 Traditional UNIX Filesystem Access Control Policies

By default, UNIX-like operating systems only provide simplistic Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies whose objects are files, and subjects are users.

The policy used by traditional UNIX systems is based on the concepts of *file owner*, *group of a file*, and *others*. For each file, the access rights for these three categories can be specified independently using a so-called access mode. The access mode is a bitmask which specifies whether the file owner, the group of the file, and others have read, write, or execute permissions.

Each process has its own *Effective User ID* (EUID), the user that the process is running on behalf of. When a process tries to access a file, the kernel checks the access mode of the file, and grants or denies access based on the following rules:

- If the process's effective user ID matches the file owner, the file owner's access mode is used.
- Otherwise if the process belongs to the group of the file, then the group's access mode is used.
- If neither condition holds, others' access modes are applied.

The access mode is stored in the file's inode, and can be changed by a process with the file owner's user ID using the `chmod` system call. The file owner is the user who created the file, and can be changed using the `chown` system call by a process with the effective user ID of a superuser. The group of a file is set to the group of the file owner when the file is created, and can also be changed using the `chown` system call by a process with the effective user ID of a superuser.

Later, a feature called Access Control Lists (ACL) was introduced to many UNIX-like operating systems and eventually included in the POSIX standard. ACLs provide the ability to control file permissions of specific users, rather than just owner, group and others. Similar to the classic UNIX access control policies, only processes running with the user ID that matches the owner user ID of a file can change its ACLs.

1.2 The Inherent Flaw of User-Centric Access Control

Although this kind of access control solutions has been proven to be helpful in multi-user environments, it is obviously insufficient to protect against an attack performed by a process initiated by the same user.

The fundamental weakness of the traditional UNIX DAC model, and even its extension with ACLs, lies in its reliance on user identity as the primary access control decision point. While effective at separating access between different users, it provides little to no protection within a user's own account. This deficiency is particularly problematic in modern computing environments where a user's processes are increasingly complex and often involve downloaded or third-party code.

This vulnerability stems from the "all or nothing" nature of user ownership. A process running with user's EUID inherits all of user's privileges, treating all files they own as equally accessible. There's no way to restrict a specific process, even one initiated by the user themselves, from accessing certain files or performing certain operations.

These limitations highlight the need for more sophisticated access control mechanisms that go beyond simple user identity and consider the context and trustworthiness of the process attempting to access a resource. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and sandboxing technologies are emerging solutions aiming to address these shortcomings by introducing finer-grained control over process privileges and resource access. The following chapter will explore these alternatives in detail.

Chapter 2

Current solutions, and why they won't suffice

2.1 MAC mechanisms

Many Linux OS ship with additional Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanisms (e.g. AppArmor, SELinux) that allow to restrict the usage of file system objects by specific programs.

Unfortunately, these mechanisms require a considerable amount of knowledge and effort for the user to manage them, which makes them infeasible for most single-user environments.

2.2 FGACFS

In Lovyagin et. al. 2020 [1] authors propose and implement a so called FGACFS file system that extends traditional UNIX access control policies with far more sophisticated and granular system. This also includes the ability to restrict access on per-program basis. However, due to the sheer variety of options and configurable parameters, this approach still falls short when it comes to ease of use and user-friendliness.

Additionally, all the above solutions share a significant drawback: they necessitate user intervention to secure files, even when those files are never accessed. For instance, if access to a file system object is denied (allowed) for all programs by default and only allowed (denied) for specific ones, granting (revoking) access for new programs requires users to modify access permissions proactively.

While some solutions offer automatic inheritance or assignment of rules and access control policies, they still need extensive manual configuration. Even if inheriting all access permissions from a default value were practical, installing new programs would always necessitate updating rules to adhere to the principle of least privilege.

Another problem of these solutions, is that their policies are granted forever and the user is never informed about the actual usage of those permissions, which makes them more vulnerable to attacks by proxy. For example, if the program `cat` is allowed to read contents of the file `~/secrets/text.txt`, malicious program may execute `cat ~/secrets/text.txt > ~/stolen-text.txt` command at any time, without any warning and regardless of whether the malicious program has access to `~/secrets/text.txt` or `~/stolen-text.txt`. If the user only granted read permissions to `cat` when they are actually using the program themselves, such attack could likely be avoided.

2.3 Containerisation

Another solution to consider, is using containerised software distribution, like Flatpak [2], Snapcraft [3] or AppImage [4]. Those types of package distribution systems either use Linux feature called *namespaces* or leverage MAC mechanisms to isolate software from the rest of the system. Aside from solving common dependency management problems, this approach also allows some capabilities of the distributed software to be restricted, like access to camera, hardware devices, but, most importantly, file system objects.

However, because the developer of the distributed software is responsible for defining the permissions that his own program needs, it often leads to programs having excessive privileges after installation¹ without any notification of the user.

Additionally, it is a responsibility of the software developer to choose the distribution method, and despite containerised software getting more and more popular, there are still plenty of programs that can only be installed using traditional methods, that do not offer any mechanisms for restricting file system access.

Furthermore, some software is impractical to sandbox. For example, because of the FlatPak's design, CLI software has to be run with `flatpak run` command and has to use often long and hard-to-remember package names, which may appear rather cumbersome for most users.

2.4 Android

Another, similar solution can be found in the Android operating system. Here, all apps are sandboxed by default. But Android does way more than Flatpak: it adds an interactive component to the access control.

¹It is important to mention, that although this flaw remains unmitigated, the analysis made by Dunlap et al. 2022 [5] shows that most package maintainers actively attempt to define least-privilege application policies.

When an app need permission to access the shared storage (part of the filesystem, common to all applications), an overlay is displayed, prompting the user for their decision on whether to allow or deny access to user's files. Notably, this approach avoids the problem of granting permissions up front, and always informs the user about the permissions that the app wishes to have.




Figure 2.1: Permissions dialogues in Android 14: The location access permission dialogue (a) shows three options: "While using the app", "Only this time" and "Don't allow". The media access permission dialogue also has three, but different options: "Allow limited access", "Allow all" and "Don't allow"

Furthermore, starting in Android 11, whenever an app requests a permission related to location, microphone, or camera, the user-facing permissions dialogue contains an option called "Only this time". If the user selects this option in the dialogue, the app is granted a temporary one-time permission.[6]

Unfortunately, Android access control system is specific to Android. Also, it inherits the already mentioned drawbacks of containerisation, and only works through special API, thus requiring the software to be redesigned to work with such an access control system.

2.5 Ranacco

Finally, in McIntosh et al. 2021 [7] authors propose and implement software called *Ranacco*, which attempts to analyse various system environmental factors (e.g. latest mouse and keyboard activity) and file system operations to detect potentially malicious actions made by processes, in which case it delegates access control decision to the user. This approach avoids the shortcomings of other possible solutions, while remaining easy-to-use. Although this system is more advanced than the one we propose in this thesis, not only is it exclusive to Windows, but it also remains unavailable for the general public.

2.6 Requirements for the solution

The key issues with existent solutions, that our the system proposed in this thesis will try to address are as follows:

- Not all solutions assume processes to be malicious until proven (confirmed by the user to be) safe. Quite often access control permissions are either predefined, inferred or assumed.
- Some solutions can only enforce access policies on software that is distributed in a special way. This leaves the file system just as unprotected against all other software.
- Most solutions require passive action from the user besides initial installation (e.g. you have to reconfigure policies all the time). This adds further inconvenience to using such systems.
- Most solutions grant permissions forever, which significantly increases attack surface. Specifically, this opens up possibilities for attacks by proxy.
- Majority of solutions focus on preventing unwanted access by other users, which makes it unsuitable for single-user environments.
- Solutions are either overly complex and not user-friendly, or too simplistic to provide adequate granularity of permissions. This either leads to slower adoption of such systems, or makes them insufficient at protecting user data.

Chapter 3

Interactively Controlled File System

This chapter presents the solution developed for this thesis, the Interactively Controlled File System (ICFS), a user-centric filesystem layer designed to enhance access control through real-time user input.

ICFS provides users with direct control over filesystem access decisions. Unlike traditional systems relying on static policies, ICFS dynamically prompts users for authorization via a graphical interface, ensuring decisions align with immediate contextual needs.

Key Features:

- **User-Friendly Design:** Requires no prior configuration or specialized knowledge. The intuitive interface eliminates complex terminology, enabling seamless interaction.
- **Dynamic Policy Enforcement:** Permissions are established on-demand and stored for future reference, minimizing repetitive prompts.
- **Granular Control:** Policies apply at the process-file level, with options to generalize rules for broader categories, reducing user fatigue.
- **Backward Compatibility:** Implemented via the FUSE framework, ICFS intercepts system calls without altering existing software workflows.

3.1 Usage

To deploy ICFS, the user selects a target directory and executes the command as shown in Figure 3.1

This mounts ICFS over the specified directory, enforcing access control for all subsequent interactions. While the name includes "File System," ICFS operates as a filesystem layer, intermediating between the physical filesystem (e.g., ext4) and user

```
icfs <FUSE arguments> [mounpoint] [permission database] <ICFS arguments>
```

Figure 3.1: Command that mounts ICFS over the folder denoted as [mounpoint], while using the permanent permission database stored in the file denoted as [permission database]. <ICFS arguments> and <FUSE arguments> denote ICFS arguments and libfuse arguments respectively.

processes. It preserves the appearance of the original filesystem while enforcing its own access logic (implementation details in section 4.1).

3.2 Access Control Model

ICFS adopts a straightforward access control model:

- Subjects: Processes requesting access.
- Objects: Files or directories undergoing access attempts.

When a process requests access (e.g., open, modify, delete) to a file without pre-existing permissions, ICFS generates an access dialogue (see Figure 3.2).




Figure 3.2: ICFS Access Dialogue: Displays the process executable name, PID, and target file path. Users may adjust the file scope, toggle permanent permissions, or grant/deny access.

The dialogue contains three functional elements:

- Access Grant Buttons.
 - Yes Button : Grants temporary access to the requested file to the requesting process only. If the user selects this option, the process is allowed to proceed with the requested access (e.g., read, write).
 - No Button : Denies access to the file for the current process. The filesystem returns an error (e.g., EACCES) to the requesting process, mimicking standard permission denial behavior.
- Permanent Permission Checkbox: A toggle labelled "Permanent" allows the user to persist the access decision beyond the current process. If checked, the permission rule (allow/deny) is stored in a local configuration database. The rule then applies to all future access attempts by processes (and any of their child processes) with an executable filename matching the requesting process. If unchecked, the decision applies only to the requesting process and its child processes. That is, the process can actually access the file multiple times with this permission. Permissions granted with this box toggled on (off) will from now on be referred to as "permanent" ("temporary").
- File Path Substitution Field: A text input field pre-filled with the absolute path of the requested file. Users may edit this field to modify scope of the permission (e.g., granting access to all files in the parent directory instead of a single file).

Behaviour changes slightly, if the operation is performed on a directory or a symbolic link: If the file is a directory, only changing the access mode and removal require permission from the user. With symbolic links, following is always permitted. If a process attempts to create a file, it is automatically granted temporary access to the file it has created.

This model addresses five key limitations of traditional systems:

- Reactive Configuration: No upfront setup required; permissions emerge organically.
- Temporary Permissions: Users may limit access to a single instance.
- Scalable Granularity: Policies adapt from specific files to broader categories.

The remaining two criteria are analysed in the next section.

3.3 Least Privilege vs. Usability

Balancing the principle of least privilege with usability posed the greatest design challenge. Strict enforcement – prompting for every access attempt – would minimize risk but overwhelm users.

To reduce friction, ICFS needs to keep the number of dialogues to minimum. This necessitates avoiding prompts for actions likely to be safe. However, we still aim to avoid granting excessive privileges by default.

When ICFS is initially started, no user decisions are known, and thus no processes have access to protected files. Each new access attempt triggers a privilege escalation request via the access dialogue.

Applying this rule strictly to all filesystem objects – including directories and symbolic links – with intelligent user decisions, would perfectly adhere to the principle of least privilege.

However, such strictness would render ICFS excessively cumbersome to use. To mitigate this, the rule has been relaxed to compromise user data as little as possible.

Firstly, Unlike POSIX, ICFS does not restrict directory visibility. While this exposes file structures, directory names rarely contain sensitive data.

Second, processes are permitted to create files without restriction. This decision is based on the observation that many programs create auxiliary and temporary files. For instance, the pdfLaTeX compiler creates 21 files in the source directory for this thesis, only 10 of which are human-editable; the remaining files are intermediary output of the compiler. Requiring the user to grant permissions for all these files would more than double the decision-making burden.

While this approach increases the potential for malicious processes to disrupt other processes, the risk is considered lower than the burden of constantly prompted permission requests. We discuss these limitations in section 5.3.

Thirdly, all access permissions apply to the child processes too. Since only the parent process has control over starting its children, it is theoretically safe to presume that non-malicious processes won't spawn malicious child processes. Of course, this presumption is not necessarily true in reality: programs contain a plethora of bugs some of which might as well allow for arbitrary code execution, and thus starting of unwanted programs as its children.

However, we decided that the burden caused by having to allow access to all its children is way too high. For example, the Neovim text editor may spawn up to five additional child processes that analyse the opened file, such as code linters, formatters and debuggers. We discuss potential threats that relate to this rule in section 5.3.

Chapter 4

Implementation

This chapter outlines the software design and architecture of ICFS, detailing how these elements address the challenge of fine-grained access control. Subsequent sections introduce the FUSE framework, methods for managing process-specific permissions, and the architectural strategies employed to mitigate unauthorised filesystem access.

4.1 FUSE framework

To regulate filesystem operations, ICFS employs the FUSE (Filesystem in Userspace) framework[8], which intercepts filesystem calls. FUSE enables the creation of custom filesystems or layers in user space, offering flexibility and ease of implementation. It provides an API for developers to define filesystem behavior. Once implemented (hereafter termed the FUSE application), the system mounts the custom filesystem at a specified location, substituting standard filesystem operations with methods defined by the API.

ICFS implements this API in C using the libfuse3 library [9]. It initializes the FUSE daemon via the `fuse_main()` function, which manages communication between the kernel and the FUSE application. Rather than directly overriding system calls, FUSE interacts with the kernel through `/dev/fuse`, a specialized device file that translates filesystem requests into API method invocations using a dedicated protocol.

ICFS does not have a backing store (a separate filesystem that contains actual data). Instead, it functions as a so-called passthrough filesystem, where system calls are forwarded to the original filesystem, if access control policies allow them.

To enforce access restrictions, ICFS mounts directly over the target directory, intercepting all access requests directed to it. As part of Linux’s Virtual Filesystem (VFS) architecture, processes interacting with the protected directory are routed through ICFS. However, ICFS retains direct access to the underlying files by opening the directory with the `O_PATH` flag before mount. Subsequent operations are executed us-

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ing "at"-suffixed system calls like `openat()`, performed directly at the file descriptor level[10], which bypasses ICFS's own layer.

4.2 Permission tables

To enforce an access control policy over time, filesystem needs to store user decisions in an appropriate data structure. As described in section 3.2, ICFS can give out two types of permissions: temporary and permanent. To accommodate this access control model, ICFS implements two data structures: a temporary permissions table, and a permanent permissions table, which we describe in detail in subsection 4.2.1 and subsection 4.2.2 respectively.

To pass permissions to child processes, both tables use `procfs`. When a permission check for the requesting process yields no results, recursive checks are performed on parent processes by traversing the process tree.

4.2.1 Temporary permissions

To function, temporary permissions storage should contain all information needed to identify the process, and associate the files to which the access is denied or allowed with it. We chose to keep track of processes by comparing the following characteristics:

- Process ID: Number that uniquely identifies a process on Linux systems.
- Start time: The time the process started after system boot. The value is expressed in clock ticks.

The process is considered the same if and only if both characteristics match.

At first, it might seem that factoring in start time is excessive. However, only using PID as the only identifying property of a process is problematic: PID is only unique among the currently running processes, not across the entire uptime of the system. Processes can not only acquire the PID of another, already finished process, but also attempt to request a specific PID. The start time is looked up in `procfs` by PID, which is provided by `libfuse`.

The temporary permissions table consists of tuples $(pid, starttime, allowed, denied)$, where *allowed* and *denied* are sequences of files, that the process is allowed or denied to access respectively.

In our implementation, entries are organised in a hash map, with PIDs as keys. This provides quick lookup of entries much needed for filesystem operations. ICFS uses the hash map implementation from the Convenient Containers library [11], that is well-tested and has an intuitive interface, which has helped to simplify the development.

One disadvantage of such a data structure, is that there isn't any inherent mechanism to remove entries that are no longer valid (e.g. permissions of a process that is already finished).

Unfortunately, we haven't found an efficient way to remove expired entries in the temporary permission table. On Linux, a process can't be notified of other processes' end unless they are child processes or the tracking process is being run with superuser permissions [12]. Hence, we had to resort to cleaning out expired entries using the garbage collection technique: an independent thread periodically checks validity of every entry in the table. If an entry is invalid, it is erased.

4.2.2 Permanent permissions

Since permanent permissions are granted to all processes' with the same executable, only its filename is needed for identification. Since the permissions have to persist after filesystem restart, the table needs to be stored on the disk. Hence, we chose SQLite [13] as the backend for the permanent permissions table. It is well-tested and lightweight, making it an ideal choice for a program like ICFS.

Due to specifics of relational databases, the permissions are stored as a relation $(executable, filename, type)$, where *executable* is the filename of the executable, *filename* is a filename of the file that the permission targets and *type* is a boolean value indicating whether the permission allows or prohibits access to the target file.

The database is stored in a file on the disk that the user chooses during startup. The database file is protected from outside access using standard POSIX permissions: during installation, a special user is created for ICFS, the owner UID of the executable is set to the UID of the new user, and the `setuid` bit is set, to allow other users to launch ICFS as a special user. On startup, database file is created as the special user, and the access mode is set to prohibit access by any other user. After the database is opened, UID of ICFS process (effective UID) is switched to the UID of the user (real UID) that originally started it using the `setuid` system call. The database remains open for the rest of the runtime of ICFS.

Unfortunately, in the current version of ICFS there is no way to edit the permanent permission table. We address this limitation in more detail in section 5.5.

Chapter 5

Results

We tried to assess the quality of ICFS by the following metrics:

- Security : Does ICFS effectively mitigate unauthorized access by untrusted processes?
- Usability : Does the interactive model reduce configuration burden while maintaining user control?
- Performance : What is the overhead introduced by ICFS compared to native filesystem operations?

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5.1 Test environment

Performance and usability evaluations were conducted on an HP Pavilion Laptop 15-cc563st equipped with an Intel® Core™ i7-7500U processor, a Western Digital WDS250G2B0B WD Blue 3D NAND M.2 SATA SSD (250GB), and 12 GB of DDR4 RAM. The system ran Fedora Linux 42 (Workstation Edition) with kernel version 6.14.5-300.fc42.x86_64 and GNOME 48 under the Wayland session, and a btrfs-formatted disk. For additional compatibility testing, a KVM virtual machine hosted on the same hardware emulated a Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm) environment with kernel 6.1.0-27-amd64, ext4 filesystem, GNOME 43.9, and the X11 windowing system. The virtual machine had 2 CPU cores and 2 GB of RAM.

To simulate real-world usage, ICFS was mounted to a directory pre-populated with files, and interactions were tested across eight widely used applications:

- T_EXstudio.
- Programming IDE/text editor (Neovim).
- Markdown editor (Apostrophe).

- A web browser (Mozilla Firefox).
- File manager (GNOME Files, also known as Nautilus).
- File synchronisation software (Syncthing).
- Standard command line core utilities (e.g. `ls`, `cd`, `grep`, ...).

These tools were selected for their prevalence and diverse filesystem interaction patterns. Except for Syncthing, Apostrophe (distributed via Flatpak containers) and Firefox (Flatpak and native versions), all applications were installed as native packages.

5.2 Usability

Testing revealed that most applications interacted smoothly with ICFS. Command line utilities, Syncthing, Apostrophe, TeXstudio and Neovim required a single permission prompt when opening existing files, with no further interruptions for new file creation. Furthermore, they have only maintained access to files they actually needed to function.

GNOME Files (Nautilus) exhibited unexpected behaviour. While functional without access permissions, its thumbnail generation process triggered repeated prompts. The file manager employs an external utility, `gdk-pixbuf-thumbnailer`, to create previews of files such as images.




Figure 5.1: Example of a picture mini-preview: image on the left is the scaled-down version of the actual image stored in the file.

Each preview required individual authorisation because the thumbnailer operates per-file, invalidating temporary folder permissions after each new image access. A pragmatic solution involves granting permanent access to the thumbnailer for specific directories – a trade-off between convenience and security.

Firefox interactions were limited to file downloads and uploads, which utilise system-level file selection dialogues provided by `xdg-desktop-portal` service, and managed by the system file manager.




Figure 5.2: File selection dialogue in Firefox.

Hence, it inherited all the usability issues Nautilus had. This dependency also introduced security implications discussed in the following section.¹

Impact on shell script usability was significant. Since each shell command spawns a new process, users must grant permissions for every command individually.² A partial mitigation involved redirection operators (`>`, `>>`), which force the shell interpreter to handle file operations, allowing child processes to inherit permissions. However, this approach breaks compatibility with existing scripts. This limitation was anticipated, and potential solutions are discussed in section 5.5.

5.3 Security

While ICFS represents a significant improvement over traditional access control systems in single-user environments, its design contains notable limitations.

ICFS theoretically allows users to control every filesystem access operation, but the system’s security depends heavily on the user’s ability to interpret and respond to access requests. Despite efforts to make the interface accessible, the system generates prompts that may confuse average users. For example, access attempts by Apostrophe were displayed as actions by `/usr/bin/python3.12`. This occurs because Apostrophe is written in Python, an interpreted language: all Python programs execute under the Python interpreter, causing dialogues to display the interpreter path rather than the application name. This limitation stems from ICFS’s permission system, which

¹Only the Flatpak version of Firefox was affected.

²Permanent permissions for core shell utilities are discouraged, as they expose the filesystem to unrestricted access via these tools.

tracks processes at the executable level. Users must understand this behavior to avoid inadvertently granting interpreters permanent access to files, which would expose them to all scripts executed by the interpreter.

Another challenge arises with Flatpak-packaged applications, which often obscure filesystem paths within their sandboxes. For instance, Syncthing’s relocated executable path invalidated `/proc/pid/exe`, the mechanism ICFS uses to resolve process identities via the `readlink` system call. Current implementations rely on unvalidated paths returned by `readlink`, leaving the system vulnerable to attacks where malicious processes mask their identity by manipulating sandboxed paths.

A larger, unresolved issue involves the `xdg-desktop-portal` daemon. To unify file-chooser interfaces across desktop environments, this background service handles file opening operations on behalf of requesting processes via D-Bus³. The open file descriptors are then passed to the requesting processes, allowing it to use the file normally. While simplifying file management, the daemon prevents ICFS from identifying the original requesting process, thereby undermining granular access control.

A critical unresolved issue involves the `xdg-desktop-portal` daemon, which centralises file-chooser interfaces across desktop environments. By handling file operations on behalf of requesting processes via D-Bus,⁴ the daemon obscures the original process, undermining ICFS’s granular access control.

Consequently, files created through `xdg-desktop-portal` become accessible to any process using the daemon. To address this, the `--no-perm-on-create` flag disables permission grants during file creation. However, `xdg-desktop-portal` retains user-controlled file selection via graphical interfaces, ensuring safety⁵ in this context. This highlights a broader concern: similar behaviours in other daemons may exist, even if undetected in our analysis.

5.3.1 Safety of graphical interfaces

While ICFS’s access control system deters unprepared attackers, programmatic GUI interaction by an informed attacker poses a valid attack vector. ICFS relies on the assumption that GUI interactions are inaccessible to unprivileged processes; otherwise, an attacker could programmatically grant themselves permissions.

On X11 systems, tools like `xdotool` [14] enable unprivileged processes to simulate keystrokes and interact with windows, as verified in our Debian testing environment. In contrast, Wayland’s security model restricts such interactions: `xdotool` and its Wayland

³D-Bus is an inter-process communication method on Linux.

⁴D-Bus is an inter-process communication mechanism in Linux.

⁵That is, safety equivalent to ICFS, since both of them depend on the inaccessibility of GUI interaction by foreign processes.

equivalent, ydotool [15], cannot interfere with windows without explicit user permission via GNOME’s graphical dialogues or superuser configuration.

Theoretical risks remain via AT-SPI accessibility protocols, which could potentially interact with access dialogues. As a preventive measure, ICFS disables all accessibility features in access dialogues. However, this issue was not fully investigated within the scope of this thesis. Further research is needed to identify and address other potential attack vectors through desktop environment interfaces.

5.4 Performance

Performance testing revealed a substantial impact on filesystem operations. A bash script opening large volumes of files in parallel ran in 0.714s on bare btrfs, 16.189s with temporary ICFS permissions, and 33.409s with permanent permissions. While ICFS’s access control layer likely affects other operations, these were not tested as they fall outside its scope.

Despite these synthetic benchmarks, real-world usability remained unaffected. Applications with intensive filesystem usage, such as Syncthing, experienced no critical slowdowns.

5.5 Future work

Current version of ICFS lacks a way to edit permissions once they were granted. A solution would be to develop a simple tool that would communicate with ICFS daemon through a UNIX domain socket owned by a special user, and be able to open and edit the permanent permissions database via sqlite3 library.

A critical area for future refinement lies in addressing vulnerabilities stemming from programmatic interactions with graphical interfaces. ICFS currently assumes that GUI interactions remain inaccessible to unprivileged processes, yet this premise is challenged by tools like xdotool (on X11 systems), which can simulate keystrokes and manipulate windows without user consent. While Wayland’s stricter isolation policies mitigate this risk – requiring explicit user approval via GNOME dialogues or superuser privileges for tools like ydotool – other exploits might be available to attackers, that were left unexplored in this thesis.

Security limitations demand deeper integration with sandboxing frameworks. The current reliance on resolving process identities via `/proc/pid/exe` proves insufficient in containerized environments, where executable paths are virtualized. The reliance of ICFS on process-level identity introduces challenges when interacting with containerised applications, which obscure the original requesting process. Future work could

explore deeper integration with such services to propagate context-aware permissions. For example, ICFS might integrate with Flatpak permission system to coordinate access control, possibly even set Flatpak sandbox permissions via graphical access dialogues (which Flatpak currently lacks).

The current design's requirement for per-process permission grants creates friction for shell scripting, where new processes are frequently spawned. A potential solution involves implementing a session-based model, allowing the user to grant permissions to all processes with matching session ID (which typically corresponds to a single shell instance or script). This approach would preserve security while maintaining compatibility with existing scripts.

Conclusion

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