Fixed a typo in current solutions section

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BritishTeapot 2025-04-09 14:30:31 +02:00
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Additionally, all the above solutions share a significant drawback: they necessi
While some solutions offer automatic inheritance or assignment of rules and access control policies, they still need extensive manual configuration. Even if inheriting all access permissions from a default value were practical, installing new programs would always necessitate updating rules to adhere to the principle of least privilege.
Another problem of these solutions, is that their policies are granted forever and the user is never informed about the actual usage of those permissions, which makes them more vulnerable to attacks by proxy. For example, if the program \verb|cat| is allowed to read contents of the file \verb|~/secrets/text.txt|, malicious program may execute \verb|cat ~/secrets/text.txt > ~/stolen-text.txt| at any time, without any warning and regardless of whether the malicious program has access to \verb|~/secrets/text.txt| or \verb|~/stolen-text.txt|. If the user only granted read permissions to \verb|cat| when they are actually using the program themselves, such attack could likely be avoided.
Another problem of these solutions, is that their policies are granted forever and the user is never informed about the actual usage of those permissions, which makes them more vulnerable to attacks by proxy. For example, if the program \verb|cat| is allowed to read contents of the file \verb|~/secrets/text.txt|, malicious program may execute \verb|cat ~/secrets/text.txt > ~/stolen-text.txt| command at any time, without any warning and regardless of whether the malicious program has access to \verb|~/secrets/text.txt| or \verb|~/stolen-text.txt|. If the user only granted read permissions to \verb|cat| when they are actually using the program themselves, such attack could likely be avoided.
Another solution to consider, is using containerised software distribution, like FlatPak\cite{FLATPAK}, Snapcraft\cite{SNAP} or AppImage\cite{APPIMAGE}. Those types of package distribution systems either use Linux feature called \emph{namespaces} or leverage MAC mechanisms to isolate software from the rest of the system. Aside from solving common dependency management problems, this approach also allows some capabilities of the distributed software to be restricted, like access to camera, hardware devices, but, most importantly, file system objects.